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Abstract 
 
The GSM network with the greatest worldwide number 
of users, succumbs to several security vulnerabilities. 
The Short Message Service (SMS) is one of its superior 
and well-tried services with a global availability in the 
GSM networks. The main contribution of this paper is to 
introduce a new secure application layer protocol, 
called SSMS, to efficiently embed the desired security 
attributes in the SMS messages to be used as a secure 
bearer in the m-payment systems. SSMS efficiently 
provides confidentiality, integrity, authentication and 
non-repudiation for the SMS messages. It provides an 
elliptic curve-based public key solution that uses public 
keys for the secret key establishment of a symmetric 
encryption. It also provides the attributes of public 
verification and forward secrecy. It efficiently makes the 
SMS messaging suitable for the m-payment applications 
where the security is the great concern.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The mobile communications has experienced a great 
acceptance among the human societies. At the beginning 
of 2007, the worldwide number of mobile users reached 
to 2.83 billion people [1]. The SMS is the most popular 
data bearer/service within GSM, IS-95, CDMA2000, 
and other cellular networks. It is a store-and-forward, 
easy to use, popular, and low cost service. While it is 
mainly used for the personal communications, it has also 
been used in applications where the other party is an 
information system. This includes a wide variety of 
applications ranging from remote control of the 
apparatus [2] to the m-banking and m-payment [3].  
 The Global Service for Mobile communications 
(GSM) with the greatest worldwide number of users 
suffers from many security problems [4]. In the GSM, 
only the airway traffic between the Mobile Station (MS) 
and the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) is optionally 
encrypted with a weak and broken stream cipher (A5/1 
or A5/2). The authentication is unilateral and also 
vulnerable. The SMS messaging has some extra security 
vulnerabilities due to its store-and-forward feature, and 
the problem of fake SMS that can be conducted via the 
Internet. When a user is roaming, the SMS content 
passes through different networks and perhaps the 
Internet that exposes it to various vulnerabilities and 
attacks. Another concern is arisen when an adversary 
gets access to the phone and reads the previous 
unprotected messages. To exploit the popularity of SMS 
as a serious business bearer protocol, it is necessary to 
enhance its functionalities to offer the secured 
transaction capability. Data confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and non-repudiation are the most 
important security services in the security criteria that 
should be taken into account in many secure 
applications. However, such requirements are not 
provided by the traditional SMS messaging. Due the vast 
area of applications, each of them having a different 
level of security requirements, the most profitable 
solution is via the end-to-end security or the security at 
the application layer. It will be a network independent 
solution and does not need any change in the network's 
infrastructure. The security of SMS messaging at the 
application layer is considered in some literature [5-8]. 
The TS 03.48 standard [9] that was designed for the SIM 
Application Toolkit (SAT) can also be used for 
providing the end-to-end security in any SMS message 
outgoing or incoming to the Subscriber Identity Module 
(SIM).  
In this paper, a new Secure SMS messaging protocol 
(SSMS) is introduced. Section 2 briefly describes the 
proposed protocol, section 3 takes a glimpse at its 
security attributes, and section 4 gives the conclusions.  
 
2. The Proposed Scheme (SSMS) 
 
A brief description of our SSMS protocol is provided in 
this section. The end-to-end security in the cellular 
systems can be generally provided by exploiting the 
processing capabilities of one or some of the following 
items: 
1) The Mobile Equipment (ME) using the programming 
languages, 
2) The SIM card using SAT, 
3) An additional smart card, e.g. JavaCard, 
4) A crypto-processor that is embedded in the ME, 
5) A portable PC (laptop) connected to the ME. 
 The SSMS provides the end-to-end security and is 
based on the first solution. It suggests using J2ME (Java 
2 Mobile Edition) as the programming platform. J2ME 
is a runtime environment designed for resource restricted 
devices such as mobile phones and Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDA). It consists of Connected Limited 
Device Configuration (CLDC), and Mobile Information 
Device Profile (MIDP). A MIDlet is a program 
developed in J2ME. The MIDlet uses classes defined in 
APIs of CLDC and MIDP, and is run by the Java virtual 
machine (JVM). A J2ME application is a collection of 
byte code classes packed into a Java Archive file (JAR). 
However, it is also possible to use other platforms as 
they provide a way to access the extended feature of the 
SIM card. In J2ME, this feature is provided by the 
optional Security and Trust Service API (SATSA) 
package [10]. In the SATSA specifications, 
communications with the SIM card applications is 
defined via the APDU format of message exchange. In 
J2ME, the Wireless Messaging API (WMA) [11] 
provides the ability of sending and receiving SMS 
messages. The J2ME environment does not contain the 
cryptographic functions. However, the Lightweight API 
of the Bouncy Castle [12] can be used for this purpose. 
Obfuscators can also be used for both decreasing the 
JAR size and hardening the reverse-engineering of the 
produced codes. SSMS works on all Java enabled 
mobile phones supporting WMA and MIDP 2.0. 
The SSMS protocol consists of the initialization 
phase, the message exchange phase in which the 
participants exchange their secured short messages, and 
the judge verification phase that is used when any 
dispute occurs. The revocation phase can follow the 
typical rules of Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) and 
will not be considered in this paper. 
 
2.1. Initialization 
 
The initialization phase of the SSMS includes: 
1) Selecting the domain parameters. 
2) Registering the user details into the system, 
generating the public/private keys, and issuing a 
certificate for the public key of each user. 
3) Installing the application software on the mobile 
phone. 
 The domain parameters consist of a suitably chosen 
elliptic curve E defined over the finite field qF with the 
Weierstrass equation of the form baxxy  32  and a 
base point )( qFEG  in which q is a large prime 
number. In order to make the elliptic curve non-singular, 
qFba ,  should satisfy )(mod0274 23 qba  . To 
guard against small subgroup attacks [13], the point G 
should be of prime order n ( OnG  where O denotes the 
point of elliptic curve at infinity), and we should have 
qn 4 . To guarantee the intractability of ECDLP to 
the Pollard-rho and Pohlig-Hellman algorithms [14], 
1602n  is recommended. To protect against other 
known attacks on special classes of elliptic curves, n 
should not divide 1iq  for all Vi 1 ( 20V  
suffices in practice [15]), qn  should be satisfied, and 
the curve should be non-supersingular [13]. 
 A strong block cipher such as AES is recommended 
to be chosen for encrypting the messages. It will be used 
in the core of SSMS protocol. It is also feasible to 
provide a list of block ciphers and let the user choose the 
suitable algorithm. However, it is not recommended 
since it can increase the code size of the application.  
 The private key of user U is a randomly selected 
integer ]1,1[  nSK RU , and the corresponding public 
key is generated as GSKPK UU  . Two different 
approaches can be followed for the public/private key 
generation: 
1) Generating the public/private keys in a Key 
Generating Server (KGS), as is depicted in Figure 1. 
2) Generating the public/private keys in the ME, as is 
depicted in Figure 2. 
 In the first approach that is recommended by the 
SSMS, the public/private keys are directly and securely 
stored on the SIM cards. The mobile phones are not 
capable of generating very strong random numbers to be 
used as strong private keys so the first approach is 
preferred as it provides more security. The second 
approach, on the other hand, has more flexibility and 
may be suitable for some applications. However, several 
precautions should be taken into account when using the 
second approach: The Certificate Authority (CA) should 
verify that each entity really possesses the corresponding 
private key of its claimed public key. This may be 
accomplished by a zero-knowledge technique. To thwart 
the invalid-curve attacks, the CA server should also 
check the validity of public keys [13]. 
 
 
Figure 1. When the key generation is taken 
place in a KGS 
 
 
Figure 2. When the key generation is taken 
place in the ME 
 
 The CA server issues a certificate UCert  for the 
public key of each user. The certificates contain strings 
of information that uniquely identify users and bind their 
identities to their public keys. The X.509v3 certificates 
are a popular type of certificates that are extensively 
used. Each user of the GSM network has several unique 
identities such as IMSI, MSISDN, and etc. For making 
the SSMS convenient, the unique international phone 
number of each user (MSISDN) is chosen as his/her 
identifier (IDU). The unique identifier, the public key, 
and the corresponding certificate of each user are also 
stored in an LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol) directory, as is depicted in Figures 1 and 2.  
 It is assumed that the participants have access to an 
authentic copy of the CA's public key, in order to use it 
for the certificate validation. The private key is 
encrypted and stored in an elementary file of the SIM 
Card. The private key can be encrypted using a user's 
password or PIN (Personal Identification Number). The 
public keys can be stored in a transparent elementary 
file. According to the GSM 11.11 standard, the trusted 
keys and certificates (e.g. CA's) are stored in 4FXX 
files. The key information can be stored in file 4F50. 
The hash value of the private key that can be used for 
validation of the encrypting password can also be stored 
in the SIM Card.  
 The application can be purchased and be manually 
installed on the mobile phone if the mobile phone is 
capable of supporting such an application. It is also 
feasible to download and install the application via an 
Over-The-Air (OTA) server, as is depicted in Figure 3. 
The Application Management Software (AMS) takes 
care of downloading and installing the application on the 
device. It is also feasible to combine the application 
installation and key generation processes if the key 
generation is to be done in the mobile phone [8]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Application installation via an OTA 
Server 
 
2.2. The Message Exchange 
 
Alice as the sender or initiator of the protocol wants to 
securely send her message M to Bob. Her message can 
be a payment order and Bob may be a bank or a service 
provider. SSMS is a certificate-based protocol so it is 
necessary for both of participants to perform the 
certificate validation [14] for the certificate of the other 
party and use it for verifying the corresponding public 
key. Since the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is too 
large for the limited memory capacity of mobile devices, 
SSMS uses the Online Certificate Status Protocol 
(OCSP) [16] for checking the revocation status of the 
certificates. It has another advantage due to the online 
and timely inquiry feature of the OCSP. However, the 
OCSP server's duties in the SSMS differ from what is 
specified in RFC 2560. The OCSP server in the SSMS 
should also verify the public key of the corresponding 
user if the queried certificate has a “good” status. The 
result of such verification should be included in the 
OCSP responses. The OCSP responses are digitally 
signed with a private key that its corresponding trusted 
public key is known to the participants. Basic 
configuration of the SSMS protocol is depicted in Figure 
4 in which OCSPA and OCSPB are the OCSP tokens for 
the certificates of Alice and Bob. The message exchange 
for the basic SSMS configuration is as follows.  
 
SSMS Composing: Alice queries the OCSP server via 
the Bob's phone number (IDB) for his public key and the 
revocation status of his certificate by sending an SMS to 
the gateway of the OCSP server. The OCSP server 
produces an OCSP response, digitally signs it, and sends 
(IDB, PKB, OCSPB) to Alice perhaps through SMS. Alice 
verifies the OCSP server's signature and uses IDB and 
PKB to generate ),,( sCR  from the message M by 
following the below steps: 
 
(1) Randomly selects an integer ]1,1[  nr R . 
(2) Computes ),( RR yxrGR  . 
(3) Computes ),()~( KKBAR yxPKSKxrK   where 
    )2mod(2~ 2/2/ fRfR xx   in which 
  1log2  nf . If OK   she goes back to step 
(1). Otherwise, she drives the secret key of 
encryption as )||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk   in which 
H' is a one-way hash function that generates the 
required number of bits for the secret key of the 
deployed symmetric encryption (l bits). 
(4) Computes the ciphertext as )(MEC k  where E(.) 
denotes the approved block cipher. 
(5) Computes )(modnrtSKs A   where 
)||||||||||( kIDyIDxMHt BRAR . 
(6) Sends ),,( sCR to Bob through SMS. 
 
 The Short Message Center (SMC) of the network 
operator automatically adds timestamps to the 
exchanged short messages. A port number is also 
assigned to the message indicating that the message is 
intended for the SSMS application so the AMS will 
automatically start the corresponding MIDlet upon 
receiving the message.  
 Each short message can contain 140×8 bits of user 
data. The GSM 03.38 standard [17] increases the 
maximum length of a text-based SMS to 160 (7-bits) 
characters. For the longer messages, new features such 
as SMS concatenation and SMS compression have been 
added in phase 2+ and are supported by the newer 
mobile phones. It is possible to concatenate several short 
messages to send messages or data records that are 
longer than 140 bytes. Each segment of the short 
message is still limited to 140 bytes but the receiving 
application is alerted that the entire message is not 
contained within one segment. The network handles 
segments of a concatenated message like any other short 
message and the relationship between the segments is 
only made at the end-entities. Although it is theoretically 
possible to concatenate 255 short messages, it is actually 
limited to five or so [18]. 
 
 
Figure 4. Basic configuration of the SSMS 
SSMS Delivering: Upon receiving an SSMS containing 
),,( sCR , the AMS on the Bob side automatically starts 
the SSMS application. The application may check 
whether the timestamp resides in an acceptable time 
window. It queries the OCSP server via the Alice's 
phone number (IDA) for her public key and the 
revocation status of her certificate by sending an SMS to 
the gateway of the OCSP server. The OCSP server 
produces an OCSP response, digitally signs it, and sends 
(IDA, PKA, OCSPA) to Bob perhaps through SMS. The 
SSMS application on the Bob side verifies the OCSP 
server's signature and follows the following steps to 
extract the Alice's message and verify her signature. 
 
(1) Checks the validity of ),( RR yxR   by verifying 
that all the following conditions are satisfied. 
Otherwise, he terminates the process with failure. 
(1.1) OR  . 
(1.2) Rx and Ry should have the proper format of 
qF elements. 
(1.3) R should satisfy the defining equation of E. 
(2) Computes ),()~( KKARB yxPKxRSKK   and 
derives the secret key of encryption as 
)||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk  . 
(3) Decrypts the received ciphertext as )(CDM k . 
(4) Computes )||||||||||( kIDyIDxMHt BRAR . 
(5) Verifies whether AtPKRsG  . If this is true, he 
accepts M as the correct plaintext that is sent by Alice 
and sends her a confirmation message M' perhaps in 
addition to a tag )(MMACt k  . Otherwise, he 
rejects M and reports it as a malicious message to the 
service provider. 
 
 Due to the processing and memory constraints, 
delegating validations to a trusted server will offer 
significant advantages. The required time of sending a 
certificate to a validation server, receiving, and 
authenticating the response can be considerably less than 
the required time of performing the certificate path 
discovery and validation. The SSMS performance can be 
greatly improved by delegating the validation process to 
a Delegated Validation (DV) server, as is depicted in 
Figure 5. The DV server is completely independent of 
the wireless network, e.g. GSM. It can be independently 
provided by the m-payment service provider. The DV 
server accomplishes the certificate validation via the 
Delegated Path Validation (DPV) protocol [19]. 
However, its duties defer from what is specified in RFC 
3379. All the short messages will be directed to the DV 
server through the GSM network. The DV server 
accomplishes the certificate and public key validations 
for both sender and recipient. It queries the database 
server for the certificates of participants via their 
MSISDN. It obtains the revocation statuses by getting 
OCSP responses from the OCSP server. It also checks 
the validity of point R. The DV server will contact the 
designated recipient (via SMS) after a successful 
validation. If any error occurs, the DV server sends an 
error message to the initiator and saves a copy in its log 
file. According to the security policies, all the 
transmitted messages may be separately saved by the 
DV server for the possible disputes. The DV server 
digitally signs its responses unless an error is occurred. 
The signed responses should include a hash value of all 
the transmitted parameters in addition to the identifiers 
of both sender and recipient.  
 In the optimized SSMS configuration, the first step of 
the basic SSMS delivering phase is omitted. Bob does 
not check the validity of point R because it is checked by 
the DV server. He just checks the DV server's signature. 
Alice does not need to get any OCSP response for the 
Bob's certificate. She just needs to know the public key 
of Bob and save it in his phone for the future uses. If she 
does not know the public key of Bob, she may query it 
from the database server, as is depicted in Figure 5. 
Therefore, the computational costs and communication 
overheads are efficiently decreased by the optimized 
SSMS configuration. 
 
 
Figure 5. Optimized configuration of the SSMS 
for the Customer-to-Customer (C2C) model 
 
 
2.3. The Judge Verification in disputes 
 
 When Bob claims that he has received ),,( sCR from 
Alice, the trusted third party (judge) wants him to 
provide ),,,,( skMCR . Bob simply extracts M and k 
from the previously saved ),,( sCR . The judge follows 
the following steps to decide on what Bob claims. 
 
(1) Checks the validity of ACert  and uses it for 
verifying APK . 
(2) Verifies whether )(CDM k . If this is not the case, 
Bob is wrong. 
(3) Computes )||||||||||( kIDyIDxMHt BRAR . 
(4) Verifies the Alice's signature by checking the 
AtPKRsG   condition. If this is not the case, Bob 
is wrong. Otherwise, Alice has sent ),,( sCR  to Bob. 
 
If the DV server saves the transmitted messages, the 
judge as an additional proof may query the DV server to 
confirm that Alice has sent a message containing 
),,( sCR  to Bob. 
 
3. The Security of SSMS 
 
The correctness of SSMS can be simply verified.  Alice 
and Bob reach to the same secret key of symmetric 
encryption as:  
 
 GSKSKxrPKSKxrK BARBARA )~()~(  
   BARBARB KPKxRSKGSKxrGSK  )~()~(  
 
 The session key derivation function of the SSMS is 
an improved version of the HMQV key establishment 
protocol [20]. However, it does not exactly correspond 
with the HMQV specifications. Defining Rx~  as the least 
significant half in binary representation of Rx  is just a 
trade-off between security and efficiency. The validation 
of R in the SSMS delivering phase is accomplished to 
prevent the invalid-curve attack. Hereunder, some 
security attributes of the SSMS are briefly described. 
 
1) Confidentiality: The confidentiality is completely 
resided in the secrecy of session key since SSMS uses a 
strong block cipher. The session key differs for different 
sessions and is derived from the private keys of the 
participants. The Unknown Key-Share (UKS) attack is 
thwarted because the Alice's identifier is involved in 
derivation of session key k. There are only two ways to 
defeat the confidentiality: finding BSK , or having both 
of ASK  and r. Deducing the corresponding r of R is 
generally in deposit of solving the Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) that is 
computationally infeasible with the chosen domain 
parameters. 
 
2) Authentication: The implicit authentication is 
provided in three ways: both the participants verify the 
certificate of the other party; only the legitimate parties 
with the true private keys can reach to a correct key 
agreement; and whenever the recipient verifies the 
signature. 
 
3) Unforgeability: It is computationally infeasible to 
forge the signature of Alice without having her private 
key ASK .  
 
4) Integrity: The hash value of message, concatenated 
with some variable parameters is involved in the 
signature generation. The integrity is guarantied by the 
security attributes of the deployed hash function and also 
the unforgeability of the signature.  
 
5) Non-repudiation: It can be easily deduced from the 
unforgeability.  
 
6) Forward secrecy of message confidentiality: As a 
one-pass protocol, we cannot prospect SSMS for the 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). However, if ASK  is 
revealed, the attacker cannot recover the previous 
messages since he should know the respective random 
number r of the corresponding session that is generally 
in deposit of solving the ECDLP.  
 
7) Public verifiability: Given ),,,,( skMCR , anybody 
can verify the signature without any need for the private 
keys of the participants. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
A new public key-based solution for secure SMS 
messaging (SSMS) is introduced in this paper. It is an 
application layer protocol that simultaneously provides 
the confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-
repudiation, public verification, and the forward secrecy 
of message confidentiality. It efficiently combines 
encryption and digital signature and uses public keys for 
a secure key establishment to be used for encrypting the 
short messages via a symmetric encryption.  Since it 
deploys elliptic curves and a symmetric encryption 
algorithm, it has great computational advantages over 
the previously proposed public key solutions while 
simultaneously providing the most feasible security 
services. It has great advantages to be used in the real m-
payment applications and whenever the secure SMS 
messaging is important. However, its structure does not 
reply on the SMS messaging and is suitable for any 
other store-and-forward technology. 
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